ኤርትራና ጎረቤቶቿ

​የኤርትራ ማስታወቂያ ሚንስቴር በድረ-ገፁ ባሠራጨዉ መግለጫ እንደሚለዉ ሶስቱ መንግሥታት በኤርትራና በኢትዮጵያ መካከል የተጀመረዉን የሠላም ሒደት-በተለይ፣ የአፍሪቃ ቀንድን ባጠቃላይ ለማተራመስ እያሴሩ ነዉ። መግለጫዉ «እርባና ቢስ» ያላቸዉ እርምጃዎች ካታር በመደበችዉ ገንዘብና የዘመቻ አገልግሎት የሚቀነባበሩ ናቸዉ። የባህር በር አልባ #Landlocked አገር መሆን አንዱ ጥቅም አለው ከተባለ ይኽው ከሀያላኑ ፍጥጫ ነጻ መሆን ነው። በዚህ የሀብታም ዓረብ አገራትና የሀያላኑ ሽኩቻ መድረክ ከመሆን እነ ጅቡቲና ኤርትራ ፤ ሱዳን፤ ሶማልያ አላመለጡም። በአንጻሩ ኢትዮጵያ ይህ ከመጋረጃው በስተጀርባ የቀይ ባህርን የመቆጣጠር ወይም የአረብ ባህር የማድረግ ውዝግብ ወይም ትግል አይመለከታትም ። በቅርቡ ኤርትራ የቀይ ባህርን ጠረፍ ለመቆጣጠር የሚደረግ ያለችውን «የጥፋት መልዕክተኞች»  ያለቻቸዉን ቱርክን፣ ቀጠርንና ሱዳንን አውግዛለች።   የቱርክ መንግሥት፤ በጎርጎሪያኑ 2019 መጀመሪያ ላይ ለማይታወቀዉ «የኤርትራ ሙስሊም ሊግ» ሊቀመንበር፣ የኤርትራ ዑለማ ሊግ/የኤርትራ ራቢጣ-አይ ዑለማ በሚል ሽፋን ፅሕፈት ቤት መክፈቱን ይጠቅሳል። መግለጫዉ እንደሚለዉ ከጥቂት ቀናት በፊት ካርቱም፣ ሱዳን በተደረገ ስብሰባ ላይ የተሳተፉ «ጥፋት አራማጅ» ሰዎችም በኤርትራና በኢትዮጵያ ላይ የጠብ አጫሪነት መልዕክት አስተላልፈዋል። ቀጠር የኤርትራ የቅርብ ወዳጅ፣ የኤርትራና የጅቡቲ ሸምጋይም ነበረች።የቀይ ባህርን የዓረብ ባህር ለማድረግ በሳዑዲ አረቢያ የሚመሩት የዓረብ መንግሥታት ከካታር ጋር ዉዝግብ ከገጠሙ ወዲሕ ግን ኤርትራ ካታርን ትታ ከሳዑዲ አረቢያ ጎን መቆሟን አስታዉቃለች። ቱርክ ባንፃሩ ቀጥር ዉስጥ ያላትን ጦር ሠፈር አጠናክራለች።

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Sigmon Fraud

ስለ ሳይኮሎጂ ሳስብ ተሎ ወደ አእምሮየ የሚመጣልኝ ታላቁ የቬንያ ሰው ሲግመንድ ፍሮይድ ነው። ፍሮይድ በሃያኛው ክፍለ ዘመን በአእምሮ ጥናት (Mind) ላይ ተፅእኖ ፈጣሪና አነጋጋሪ ከነበሩ ምሁራን አንዱ ነው። ይህ የሳይኮአናሊሲስ ጠቢብ እሱ ከነበረበት ዘመን ቀድሞ የሄደ ወይም የተሻገረ (transcend) ነው ። ሳይኮአናሊቲክ ቴራፒ የሚባል በንግግር የሚደረግ የአእምሮ ህክምና ይዞ ብቅ ሲል ብዙዎችን አስገርሟል ። ከማስገረሙም በላይ ብዙ ተከታዮች አፍርተዋል ። አብዛኛዎቹ የሳይኮሎጂ ሙሁራን የፍሮይድን ሀሳብ ሳይጠቅሱ ወይም እንደ ማጣቀሻነት ሳይጠቀሙ ማለፍ የተለመደ አይደለም። ከሁሉም በላይ ድንቅ የተባለለት የፍሮይድ ሀሳቦች የወቅቱን የስነ ልቦና ሳይንስ ሳይቀር ተፅእኖ በመፍጠር ላይ የሚገኝ በመሆኑ ነው ። ሌሎች የስነ ልቦና ተማራማሪዎች የሆነ ጥናትና ምርምር በሚያካሂዱበት ግዜ እንኳን ሳይቀር መሰረት የሚጥሉት በፍሮይድ ፅንስ ሃሳብ ነው። ፍሮይድ በመሠረቱ ስለ ሰው ልጅ ሲገልፅ በአጭሩ እንዲህ ይላል ” የሰው ልጆች ባህሪ የሚወሰነው በ Irrational force, unconscious motive, biological and instinctual drive ነው ፤ ይህንን ደግሞ ባሉት የ Psychosexual ደረጃዎች ቀስ በቀስ ያድጋል። ዋናው የፍሮይድና ተከታዮቹ የስነልቦና ማጠንጠኛ ዘዴ “Instinct ” ነው። እዚህ ላይ ፍሮይድ አክሎም የሰው ልጅ የመጨረሻ ግብ ደስታን ማግኘት ነው ይላል ። According to Freud, all humans “strive after happiness; they want to become happy and remain so” ሲግመንድ ፍሮይድ ስለሰው ልጅ ሰብእና የተረዳበት ከታካሚዎቹ ባገኘው ተመክሮ ፣ ከራሱ የህልም ትንታኔ፣ ካነበባቸው ብዙ መፅሐፍትና ካደረገው ጥልቅ ጥናትና ምርምር ነው። የፍሮይድ በንግግር የሚደረግ የአእምሮ ህክምና ዘዴ ግብ to uncover repressed memories through free association and dream analysis ” የታመቀ ትዝታን ማከም ብለው የሚቀራረብ ትርጉም ይኖረዋል ።” the therapy works by transforming what is unconscious in to what is conscious. እዚህ ላይ ሌላው ግቡ ኢጎ እንዲጠነክር በማድረግ ከሱፐር ኢጎ ጥገኝነት ነፃ ማውጣት ነው። ሳይኮኣናሊታክ ፔራፒ ከሌሎች በንግግር የሚደረጉ የአእምሮ ህክምናዎች በተለየ መልኩ ውስብስብ ነው። ረዘም ያለ ስልጠና ይፈልጋል በስልጠናው ወቅት ሰልጣኙ የአናሊሲሱ አንዱ አካል ነው። ሳይኮኣናሊታክ ፔራፒ የሚሰለጥን ሰው ለራሱም አናላይዝ ይደረጋል። ☺

ኢህአዴግ ከአባል ፓርቲዎቹ መግለጫ በኋላ ወዴት ያመራል ።?

የህወሓት ማዕከላዊ ኮሚቴ መግለጫ በበርካቶች ዘንድ የተለያዩ አነጋጋሪ ጉዳዮችን በማስነሳት እያነጋገረ ይገኛል። ከእነዚህ መካከል ዶ/ር አደም ካሴ አበበ፣ ፕሮፌሰር ህዝቅኤል ገቢሳ፣ እንዲሁም አቶ ልደቱ አያሌው በመግለጫውና በገዢው ፓርቲ ዙሪያ አስተያየታቸውን ሰንዝረዋል።

የኢህአዴግ ዕጣ

ፕሮፌሰር ህዝቅኤል ገቢሳ እንደ ጥምረት ፓርቲዎቹ አንድ ሃሳብ እንዲኖራቸው የሚጠበቅ አይደለም ይላሉ። ጥምር ፓርቲ ውስጥ ያሉ ቡድኖች ካልተግባቡ የመፍረስ እድል ይኖራል፤ ይህም አዲስ ነገር አይደለም።

ዋናው ነገር የኢህአዴግ ፓርቲዎች ጥምረት ከሌለ ሃገሪቱ እንዴት እንደምትተዳደር ጥያቄን ሊፈጥር ይችላል። ነገር ግን ገዢው ፓርቲ ችግር ውስጥ ከገባ ሰንብቷል።

ኢህአዴግን በአንድነት አዋህዶ ይዞት የነበረው ህወሓት እንደነበር የሚናገሩት ፕሮፌሰር ህዝቅኤል ገቢሳ አሁን ህወሓት ያንን ለማድረግ በሚችልበት ደረጃ ላይ ስላልሆነ እያንዳንዱ የጥምረቱ አባል የሆነ ፓርቲ በተለያየ አቅጣጫ መሄድ ከጀመሩ ቆይተዋል።

ወደፊት ልዩነቶቻቸውን አቻችለው አብረው ሊቀጥሉ ይችላሉ ወይም ደግሞ ሊታረቅ ወደማይችል ቅራኔ ውስጥ ገብተው ፓርቲው ሊፈረካከስ ይችላል፤ ነገር ግን አሁን ካለው ሁኔታ ተነስተን ይሄ ሌሆን ይችላል ለማለት አስቸጋሪ ቢሆንም ከሁለቱ ግን አንዱ ይሆናል።

ነገር ግን የኢህአዴግ ጥምር ፓርቲዎች ውስጥ እየታዩ ካሉት ነገሮች በመነሳት በጥምረቱ ውስጥ በአንድነት የመቆየት እድላቸው የመነመነ ይመስላል፤ ቢሆንም ግን ሃገሪቱ ወደ ምርጫ እየሄደች በመሆኗ ያሉባቸውን ችግሮች አቻችለው ለዚያ ሲሉ አብረው ሊቆዩ ይችላሉ።

ከሁሉ ግን ግልጽ እየሆነ የመጣው በቅርቡ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ የኢህአዴግ አባል ፓርቲዎች በግንባሩ ዉስጥ የፈጠሩትን ጥምረት በማስቀረት ወደ አንድ ወጥ ውሁድ ፓርቲነት እንሸጋገራለን ያሉት ዕቅድ ፈጽሞ ሞቶ የተቀበረ ጉዳይ ነው ሲሉ ፕሮፌሰር ህዝቄል የግንባሩ ውህደት የማይሆን እንደሆነ ይናገራሉ።

ኢህአዴግ እንደ ድርጅት አለ፤ በድሮው በጥንካሬው በድሮው አስተሳሰብና ሞገስ ግን የለም። ተወደደም ተጠላም ግን ኢህአዴግ አለ አሁን ሀገሪቱን እየመራት ያለው እርሱ ነው ይላሉ አቶ ልደቱ። አሁን ለውጡን እየመሩት ያሉት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትርም የተመረጡትም በኢህአዴግ ነው።

ኢህአዴግ እርሳቸውን ሲመርጣቸው ህወሓት አባላትም እዚያው ቁጭ ብለው እጃቸውን አውጥተው ነው የመረጧቸው። ይህንን ሀገርና ህዝብ ወደዚህ አይነት ከፍተኛ ችግር የከተተው እንደ ድርጅት ራሱ ኢህአዴግ የሚባልው ድርጅት ስለሆነ ከዚህ ችግር ለማውጣትም መስራት ከፍተኛ ሚና መጫወት ያለበት ራሱ ኢህአዴግ ነው ብለው ያምናሉ አቶ ልደቱ።

“ኢህአዴግ ስንል ደግሞ ህወሓትንም ይጨምራል። ስለዚህ ከመነጣጠል ይልቅ በአብሮነት በመስራት ለለውጡ መትጋት አለበት።”

ግጭት ውስጥ ሊገቡ ይችላሉ?

እንደዚያ የሚያስቡ ወይንም ሙከራ የሚያደርጉ ኃይሎች ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ። በእኔ እምነት ግን የትግራይም ሆነ የአማራም ህዝብ በአሁኑ ወቅት አሁን ከገባበት ችግር መውጣት ነው እንጂ ወደሌላ አሳሳቢ ውጥረትና ግጭት ውስጥ የመግባት ፍላጎት አለው ብዬ አላምንም። ህዝቡ የዚያ አይነት እምነት እስካለው ድረስ እንደዚያ አይነት የፖለቲካ ፍላጎት ያላቸው ኃይሎች የሚፈልጉትን ነገር ያደርጋሉ ብለው አያምኑም አቶ ልደቱ።

ኢህአዴግ ምን ያድርግ?

ይህ ገዢ ፓርቲ፤ ኢህአዴግ የሀገሪቱን ዕጣ ፈንታ በብቸንነት ተቆጣጥሮ እያለ በሀላፊነት ስሜት መስራት አቅቶት ሚበታተን ከሆነ እርሱ ውስጥ የሚፈጠረው መበታተን ለሀገርም ሊተርፍ ይችላል የሚል ስጋት አላቸው ልደቱ።

ይህ ትልቅ ሀገርና የሕዝብ ሀላፊነት ያለባቸው መሆናቸውን አውቀው ከመቼውም በላይ ከግል እንዲሁም ከቡድን ስሜትና ፍላጎት በፀዳ መልኩ ከፖለቲካ ሽኩቻ በፀዳ መልኩ አብረው መስራት አለባቸው።

አዴፓም አሁን ባለበት ሁኔታ በከፍተኛ ደረጃ ሊረዳ የሚገባው ነው። ከፍተኛ አመራሮቹ ተገድለውበት ተዳክሟል። ይህንን ድርጅት በዚህ ወቅት ለማጥቃት መሞከርም ተገቢ አይደለም ይላሉ አቶ ልደቱ።

አቶ ልደቱ አያሌው የህወሓት መግለጫ በአንድ በኩል ሀገሪቱ ውስጥ አሳሳቢ ችግሮች መኖራቸው መጠቀሱና እነዚህን ነገሮች መንግሥት ይፍታቸው መባሉ ችግር የለውም ባይ ናቸው። በዚያ ደረጃ ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ አሳሳቢ ነገር መኖሩ አጠያያቂ አይደለም።

ነገር ግን ደግሞ አንዳንድ ነጥቦች አሁን ሀገሪቱ ውስጥ ያለውን በሰከነ መልኩ በብቃት ለመፍታት የሚያስችሉ ሳይሆኑ የበለጠ ችግሩን የሚያወሳስቡና ከባድ የሚያደርጉ ሆነው ነው ያገኘኋቸው ይላሉ።

እንደ አቶ ልደቱ አባባል አሁንም ከሕዝብ ጋር ተያይዞ ህወሓት የሚነሳበትን ቅሬታ ቦታ ሰጥቶ ለመተው ፍላጎት ያለው አይመስላቸውም።

ትምክህተኛ የሚለው አባባል በኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ ውስጥ ብዙ ችግር ፈጥሯል የሚሉት አቶ ልደቱ “እነርሱ ሲናገሩ ለጥቂቶች ነው ሕዝቡን አይደለም ቢሉም ህዝብ አባባሉን እንደ ስድብ ወስዶ ጠልቶታል። ህዝብ የጠላውን አነጋገር አሁን ለውጥ በሚፈለግበት ወቅት እየደጋገሙ ማንሳት የሚጠቅም አይመስለኝም፤ ችግርን ያባብሳል እንጂ።”

ሁለተኛ ጉዳይ ብለው አቶ ልደቱ እንደስህተት የሚያነሱት ከዚህ ጋር ተያይዞ የኢትዮጵያ ችግር የመነጨው አሁንም ከአማራ አካባቢና ከአዴፓ እንደሆነ ብቻ ተደርጎ የተገለፀ መንገድን ነው። “በመጀመሪያ ደረጃ ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ አሁን ለተፈጠረው ችግር የተጠያቂነት ደረጃ እናውጣ ከተባለ ቀዳሚው ህወሃት ነው የሚሆነው። አለበለዚያ ደግሞ በጥቅል የኢህአዴግ አባል ድርጅቶች ናቸው የሚሆኑት” ይላሉ።

አንድን ክልል እየመራ ያለ ድርጅት ለይቶ በዚህ ደረጃ ተጠያቂ ለማድረግ መሞከር፤ በዚህ ደረጃም ማስፈራራት ስም ማጥፋት (ብላክ ሜል) ማድረግ አሁን ከሚፈለገው
አንፃር ሁኔታዎችን የሚያባብስ እንጂ መፍትሄ የሚሆን እንዳልሆነ አቶ ልደቱ ይናገራሉ።

የተነሱ ሃሳቦች

ዶ/ር አደም ካሴ አበበ ሆላንድ ዘ ሄግ ውስጥ የሚገኙት የፖለቲካ ተንታኙ እንደሚሉት በመግለጫው ላይ ከፍተኛ ትኩረት የሳበው ከመንግሥት ባለስልጣናትና ከጄነራሎቹ ግድያ ጋር የተያያዘው ክፍልና በአዴፓና ህወሓት መካከል ያለው አለመግባባት የተገለፀበት ክፍል ነው። ይህም ለአርሳቸው ኢህአዴግ እንደ ግንባር ወደፊት ወዴት ነው የሚሄደው? ፣ የታቀደው ምርጫ ምን መሆን አለበት እና ሲዳማን ጉዳይ ያነሳባቸው መግለጫ ክፍሎች ወደፊት የሚያዩ ሆነው ነው ያገኟቸው።

አቶ ልደቱ በመግለጫው ውስጥ እርስ በእርሳቸው የሚጋጩ ነገሮች እንዳሉ በማንሳት፤ በአንድ በኩል የባህርዳሩና የአዲስ አበባው ግድያ የተያያዘ መሆኑን እንደሚገልጽ፤ በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ይህ ሁኔታ በአስቸኳይ ተጣርቶ እውነቱ ታውቆ ለህዝብ መገለፅ አለበት ተብሎ መባሉን ያነሳሉ።

“በመግለጫው ላይ በጣም በተቀነባበረ ሁኔታእና ረዥም ጊዜን በፈጀ ዝግጅት አዲስ አበባ ያሉት ሰዎች እንደተገደሉ ተደርጎ ሰፍሯል፤ይህ ትክክል አይደለም” ይላሉ።

Eritrea

ኢትዮጵያና ኤርትራ 20 ዓመት ያስቆጠረዉን ጠብና ጦርነት ለማስወገድ ቢስማሙም ሠላምን ለማፅናት የታሰበዉን ያሕል እርምጃ አለመወሰዱን አንዲት የኤርትራ ጉዳይ አጥኚ አስታወቁ።የኢትዮጵያ ጠቅላይ ሚንስትር ዐብይ አሕመድ አስመራን ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ ከጎበኙ ትናንት አንድ ዓመት ደፈነ።ፕሬዝደንት ኢሳያስ አፈወርቂና ጠቅላይ ሚንስትር ዐብይ አሕመድ «የአስመራ መግለጫ» የተባለዉን ዉል ካወጁ ደግሞ ዛሬ ዓመታቸዉ።የአስመራና የአዲስ አበባ መንግሥታት ጦራቸዉን ካዋሳኝ ድንበሮች ማንሳት፣የየብስና የዓየር መስመሮችን መክፈት፣ ዲፕሎማሲያዊ ግንኙነት መቀጠልን ጨምሮ ስር የሰደደዉን ጠብ ለማስወገድ የሚረዱ በርካታ እርምጃዎችን ወስደዋል።ብሪታንያዊቱ የኤርትራ ጉዳይ አጥኚና ደራሲ ሚሻኤላ ሮንግ እንደሚሉት ግን የሁለቱ ሐገራት ግንኙነት አጀማማሩ ላይ የነበረዉ ዓይነት ተስፋ አልቀጠለም።«ድንበርን የማካለል ምልክት እስካሁን የለም። ነገሮች ተስፋ እንዳደረግነዉ አይደሉም። በጣም አሳሳቢዉ  ለኤርትራዉያን ነዉ። ወታደር ምልመላዉ እንደቀጠለ ነዉ። ይሕ በየወሩ በሺሕ የሚቆጠሩ ኤርትራዉያን እንዲሰደዱ ዋናዉ ምክንያት ነዉ። ተስፋ አስቆራጭ ነዉ። የኤርትራ መንግስት በርካታ የጦር ኃይል ለማደራጀት ፣ለማንቀሳቀስና ለዉጊያ ለማዘጋጀት አሁን ምንም አይነት ምክንያት የለዉም። (ይሁንና) የተፈጠረዉን አጋጣሚ በመጠቀም የጦሩን ቁጥር ለመቀነስና ወጣቶችን ለወታደርነት መመልመሉን ለማቆም የወሰደዉ እርምጃ የለም።»
ኢትዮጵያና ኤርትራ በመካከላቸዉን የነበረዉና ጠብና ጦርነት በሰላም ለመፍታት ያደረጉት ስምምነት ከምዕራባዉያን መንግስታት  ከፍተኛ ድጋፍና አድናቆት አትርፏል።

ኢትዮጵያ ጋዜጠኞችን በማሰር፤ የጸረ-ሽብር ሕጓን መልሳ ሥራ ላይ በማዋል እና የኢንተርኔት ግልጋሎትን በማቋረጥ ወደ ቀደመው የመገናኛ ብዙኃን ነፃነት አፈና የመመለስ አደጋ እንደተጋረጠባት የጋዜጠኞች መብት ተቆርቋሪ ድርጅት ፣ (CpJ ) አስጠነቀቀ።

በአሁኑ ወቅት በትንሹ ሦስት ጋዜጠኞች በእስር ላይ እንደሚገኙ የጋዜጠኞች መብት ተሟጋቹ ሲፒጄ (CPJ) አስታውቋል። ሌሎች ሦስት ጋዜጠኞች ታስረው ቢፈቱም አሁንም የፍርድ ቤት ሙግት እንደሚጠብቃቸው ከሰሐራ በታች የሚገኙ የአፍሪካ ሃገራት የድርጅቱ ተወካይ ሞቶኪ ሙሞ ለዶይቼ ቬለ ተናግረዋል።

ሞቶኪ ሙሞ እንደሚሉት ኢትዮጵያውያን ጋዜጠኞች ሥራቸውን በአግባቡ ለመከወን ፈተና በዝቶባቸዋል።
ሞቶኪ ሙሞ «ባለፈው ሰኔ የኢንተርኔት አገልግሎት መቋረጡ የመገናኛ ብዙኃን ነፃነትን እጅግ ጎድቷል።

ጋዜጠኞች ሥራቸውን ለመሥራት፣ ከመረጃ ምንጮቻቸው ለመገናኘት፣ መረጃዎቻቸውን ለማጣራት ሰበር ዜናዎችን በፍጥነት ለማተም ፈተና ሆኗል። በግንቦት እና በሰኔ ወራት የታሰሩ ጋዜጠኞች አሉ።

ቢያንስ አንድ ጋዜጠኛ እና ባልደረባው በሥራቸው ሳቢያ ክስ ተመስርቶባቸዋል። በቅርቡ ከዚህ ቀደም ለመገናኛ ብዙኃን ብዙ ችግር ሲፈጥር በቆየው የጸረ-ሽብር ሕግ ጋዜጠኞች መታሠራቸውንም ደርሰንበታል።» ብለዋል ።

የጋዜጠኞች መብት ተሟጋቹ ያነጋገራቸው ኢትዮጵያውያን ባለሙያዎች እና የሰብዓዊ መብት ተሟጋቾች ባለፈው አንድ ዓመት የመገናኛ ብዙኃን ነፃነት መሻሻል ቢያሳይም የመንግሥቱ የቀደሙ ልምዶች የማገርሸት ምልክት ማሳየታቸውን ተናግረዋል።

የጠቅላይ ምኒስትር ዐቢይ አሕመድ መንግሥት በጀመራቸው ማሻሻያዎች ለውጥ ይደረግበታል የተባለው የጸረ-ሽብር ሕግ መልሶ ጋዜጠኞችን ለማሰር ግልጋሎት ላይ መዋሉ አሳሳቢ መሆኑን ጠቁመዋል። ሞቶኪ ሙሞ «አዎንታዊ መሻሻል ወደታየበት፣ መንግሥት ጋዜጠኞችን ወደማያስርበት እና ኢትዮጵያ የመገናኝ ብዙኃን ነፃነት የተከበረባት አገር ትሆን ዘንድ ሊያረጋግጥ ወደሚችለው የማሻሻያ እርምጃ እንመለስ ማለት እንፈልጋለን።

በእርግጥ የመገናኛ ብዙኃን ነፃነት መፃኢ እጣ-ፈንታ አሳስቦናል፤ የዛኑ ያህል የታዩ ለውጦችንም እንረዳለን። የምናነሳቸው አሳሳቢ ጉዳዮች ምላሽ አግኝተው ኢትዮጵያ የመገናኛ ብዙኃን ነፃነት የተከበረባት አገር ትሆናለች ብለን ተስፋ እናደርጋለን።» ሲሉ በአጽንዖት ተናግረዋል።

የሰብዓዊ መብት ተሟጋቹ አምነስቲ Amnesty International  ኢንተርናሽናል የኢትዮጵያ መንግሥት እርምጃ አገሪቱ ባለፈው አንድ ዓመት ገደማ ያሳየችውን መሻሻል ሊቀለብስ እንደሚችል በትናንትናው ዕለት አስጠንቅቆ ነበር። ወደ ኅንላ እንዳንመለስ ጎበዝ።

የብሄር ፌደራሊዝም 

ማምዳኒ ethnic politic

Responding to land-based conflict in Ethiopia: The land rights of ethnic minorities under federalism | African Affairs
There is a common perception that Ethiopia is unusual in Africa in having a relatively uniform system of state land ownership. While highly influential, state ownership is not the only body of law with implications for land administration. This article argues that the institutionalization of ethnic federalism and the persistence of neo-customary tenure result in considerable ambiguity, particularly regarding the land rights of non-indigenous minorities. The analysis highlights tensions between these three sets of land tenure institutions—state ownership, ethnic federalism and neo-customary tenure—and their implications for minority land rights. A case study of land-based conflict in Oromiya region, based on fieldwork conducted in 2009 and 2010, demonstrates the continuing relevance of these land tenure institutions and associated ideas in land debates in Ethiopia, both in terms of the use of these ideas by protagonists as means of justifying land claims, and the ambiguous state response to the conflict, which goes well beyond the provisions of the land policy. As such, while there are certainly particular characteristics of the Ethiopian case, many of the key issues regarding ethnicity and land mirror debates taking place across the continent.

Research has repeatedly highlighted the ‘multiple and overlapping’ nature of land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa. This institutional plurality results from the claims of colonial and post-colonial authorities to ultimate ownership of all land, while states manipulate or reinforce neo-customary tenure as a mechanism of social control.1 In contrast, the land question in Ethiopia is frequently considered to be ‘rather unique’ in sub-Saharan Africa, with a uniform policy of state land ownership with usufruct rights distributed to farmers.2 Not only was Ethiopia’s brush with European colonialism relatively brief, but the 1975 land reform that nationalized all land was ‘particularly extensive’3 and ‘effectively abolished’4 or ‘wiped out’5 previous tenure systems.

While the significance of the 1975 land reform is indisputable, there nonetheless remains ambiguity in land tenure regarding the authority of state and non-state actors and the implications of different land tenure institutions for citizenship. This ambiguity is partly due to the continuing influence of neo-customary tenure regimes, which in many places were not actually wiped out by state ownership, and, arguably, have become increasingly influential in recent years.6 However, ambiguity also results from the territorial implications of ethnic federalism introduced in the 1990s. While ethnic federalist principles resonate in certain respects with neo-customary tenure by prioritizing the land rights of ‘indigenous’ inhabitants, they are in direct tension with state ownership regarding the rights of ethnic minorities outside their ‘home’ region. This article focuses specifically on this question of the land rights of non-indigenous minorities. The analysis uses a case of land conflict in Oromiya to illustrate the continuing relevance of these competing perspectives on land tenure and to highlight how the state’s attempts to resolve the dispute reflect this ambiguity regarding minority land rights.

In doing so, the article links to important recent debates on land tenure in Africa. Land tenure regimes structure intra-community relations and relations between state and society.7 Notably, land tenure regimes have direct implications for the political salience of ethnicity, the form that resource conflict takes, and citizenship rights.8 Ethiopian land tenure is certainly an extreme case on the African continent. In the majority of sub-Saharan Africa, the dominant form of land tenure remains neo-customary, whereas in Ethiopia state ownership predominates. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system is unusual and provides an alternate rationale in land debates absent in most other countries. That said, while the relative importance of different land tenure systems varies between countries, the tensions between these systems raise closely related issues. Consequently, in Ethiopia, as in much of Africa, an important thread of contemporary land debates is the question of whether land should be made available to all citizens—who have a right to live anywhere within the country—or whether the land rights of ‘indigenous’ populations should be prioritized.

The contemporary relevance of these issues in Ethiopia has been vividly highlighted by the wave of protests that have swept across Oromiya and then Amhara since 2014. These protests have resulted from a confluence of causes, including youth unemployment, inadequate representation of individual and group interests, government corruption, fragmentation within the ruling party since 2012 and growing ethno-nationalism. However, an important flashpoint for the protests and a significant grievance concerned questions of land and territory under ethnic federalism, both in terms of the delineation of ethno-regional borders and the relative prioritization of land access for the indigenous population and outside investors.

There is already a large literature on Ethiopia’s ethnic federal project.9 Research specifically on the links between land and federalism has tended to focus on the challenge of demarcating borders between ethnic regions, leading to territorial competition along ethnic lines.10 In contrast, there has been little attempt to examine the implications of federalism for non-indigenous ethnic minority land rights. This is, perhaps, surprising given the clear implications of federalism for territory and citizenship. Both Endrias Eshete and Alemante Selassie note the potential weakness of minority land rights outside their home regions in their broad discussions of federalism, while Christophe Van der Beken highlights the limited rights of non-indigenous minorities in general.11 None of these valuable contributions, however, explores the inconsistencies regarding land rights between federalism and state ownership of land in policy and practice.

The case study presented in the article is based on fieldwork conducted in 2009 and 2010 involving 53 key informant interviews with residents of the village in question, former residents who had been displaced, and government officials. Respondents within the community were purposively selected to provide variation in ethnicity and gender, as well as to identify people who were old enough to have directly experienced the events. Key informant interviews were also conducted with the leaders of the association formed to represent the displaced population and who were therefore in a position to provide insights into the subsequent attempts at dispute resolution. Representatives of the displaced ethnic minority also provided extensive documentation relating to the appeals that they made to government officials and the government’s attempts to resolve the dispute. This written documentation constitutes a vital source of data, providing information from the time about these events, and enabling triangulation of interview testimony.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section conceptualizes the linkages between land tenure institutions and ideas before outlining the contrasting implications of three sets of ideas and laws for the land rights of ethnic minorities, notions of citizenship and territorial authority. Section two then examines the case study of a land conflict in Oromiya region and government attempts at dispute resolution over the subsequent twenty years. This case study demonstrates the continuing relevance of these three ideas and laws in land debates in Ethiopia, the use of these ideas by protagonists as means of justifying land claims, and the ambiguous state response to the conflict, which appears to go well beyond the provisions of the land policy. Section three reflects on the implications of this case for broader debates about land, ethnicity, and conflict in Ethiopia, particularly in relation to recent protests and unrest. The fourth and final section summarizes the arguments and concludes with a discussion of the parallels with debates on land tenure in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Contrasting ideas and laws on land and territory in Ethiopia

Land tenure regimes are not just means of distributing resources but key mechanisms by which states relate to their societies and project authority into rural areas. In addition to a system of property rights, therefore, as Catherine Boone argues, land tenure regimes comprise three main elements.12 First, a locus of political authority—usually the state or neo-customary authorities—with responsibility for the adjudication and enforcement of land rights. Second, a territorial jurisdiction that is subject to the land tenure regime. This jurisdiction may be restricted to a particular locality or span the entire national territory. Third, land tenure regimes imply different forms of citizenship, defined as ‘the boundaries of membership in a political community’.13 Neo-customary tenure regimes frequently imply local citizenship based on membership of a particular descent group and confer economic and political rights, including entitlements to land. In contrast, state ownership establishes a direct relationship between land users and the central state and implies national citizenship.

For discursive institutionalists, institutions, including those related to land tenure, ‘are built on ideational foundations’.14 Institutions are not the simple product of the preferences of competing interest groups but draw on ideas for inspiration. However, ideas are rarely adopted tout court as institutions. Instead, ideas are likely to be adapted through processes of bricolage—combining one idea with others—or translation—the adaptation of an idea when taken from one context to another.15 As such, ideas that help shape land tenure institutions at one point in time may continue to have a life of their own within public and political debate, independent from the institutions that they helped to shape. As such, these ideas may continue to be influential in policy debates or in the process of implementation.

This section examines three sets of influential ideas and associated institutions with direct implications for land tenure regimes, highlighting their similarities and contradictions. The first two have been promoted directly by the current government: state land ownership and ethnic federalism. The third is the neo-customary land tenure regime in Arssi, Oromiya, which, though originating in Arssi Oromo society, has been promoted and adapted by the state in recent years.

The first, and most influential, set of land tenure institutions and associated ideas relate to the system of state land ownership. The Derg regime (1974–91) nationalized all rural land in 1975, distributing usufruct rights to smallholders. The Derg undoubtedly had political motivations, namely the destruction of the landholding class that was the base of Imperial power.16 However, land reform was justified in egalitarian and social justice terms encapsulated in the rallying cry of ‘land to the tiller’. The new tenure system was universalistic—providing land access for all Ethiopian citizens—and class-based stating that, ‘any person who is willing to personally cultivate land shall be allotted rural land sufficient for his maintenance and that of his family’.17

The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) began its insurrection against the Derg in the mid-1970s. When the TPLF’s ambitions grew from liberating Tigray to seizing national power, the TPLF formed the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethno-nationalist parties to represent Ethiopia’s different ethnic groups, of which the TPLF was the leading member. On coming to power in 1991, the EPRDF largely maintained the Derg’s land policy. Again, there were important political motivations for doing so, namely to consolidate the support of the peasantry, to prevent the emergence of a landholding class, and to limit urban migration that might threaten social and political instability.18 However, there was a subtle shift in the discourse used to justify state land ownership. In addition to a shared emphasis on social equity and the prevention of class differentiation, former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi argued that state land ownership protected smallholders against displacement by market forces, providing a form of ‘social security’.19 Notwithstanding, Ethiopian citizenship and class remained key principles underpinning the land policy. As stated in the 1994 constitution: ‘Ethiopian peasants have right to obtain land without payment’.20 A similar sentiment is re-iterated in the 2005 federal land proclamation, ‘Any citizen of the country who is 18 years of age or above and wants to engage in agriculture for a living shall have the right to use rural land’.21

This is not to say that EPRDF land policy has remained a straightforward statement of Marxist principles. Rapid population growth has meant diminishing landholdings, while critics argued that agricultural productivity was impeded by tenure insecurity.22 The government’s response was to conduct land registration to enhance tenure security and investment incentives and prevent the sub-division of landholdings into unviable plots.23 In doing so, land policy has moved a step away from past universalistic principles; there are now very large numbers of landless people in rural areas who reached adulthood after the last land redistribution and have little hope of accessing land.24 Nonetheless, the idea of universal land access remains a key part of the debate.

A second, distinct set of institutions and ideas with direct implications for land tenure relates to the system of ethnic federalism. The rights of ethnic groups within Ethiopia’s political system have been a polarizing feature of political debate since the late 1960s, with opposing camps drawing on very different interpretations of Ethiopian history.25 On one hand, centrists emphasize Ethiopia’s historical unity and fear its break up. On the other hand, regionalists use narratives of internal colonization and cultural hegemony by the Amhara and Tigrayan ethnic groups as the basis of claims for greater ethnic autonomy, even secession. While the Derg dismissed ethnicity as a distraction from class consciousness, for ethno-nationalist movements including the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), ethno-nationalist struggle was seen as paving the way for class struggle.

On taking national power in 1991, the EPRDF established an ethnic federal system that, in Christopher Clapham’s words, constituted a ‘wholesale takeover of Stalin’s theory of the national question as an approach to the problem of Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity’.26 Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism is based on the primordialist idea that ethnic groups—or nations, nationalities and peoples—are objectively identifiable, independent of the views of their members.27 As such, the EPRDF primarily relied on an ethno-linguistic criterion to ‘draw round’ ethnic groups—aiming to delineate regional boundaries that provided a perfect fit between ethno-linguistic groups and territorial borders.28 In Ethiopia’s new constitution these ethnic groups were given the ‘unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’.29

Ethnic federalism therefore has important implications for land administration. Not only does federalism associate ethnic groups with defined territories, but, by providing the right to secession, it also explicitly prioritizes the land rights of ethnic groups over those of individuals. As argued by Endrias Eshete,

To confer the right to secession on national communities is to grant that a regional state’s collective property rights take priority over the property rights of outsiders—nonmembers and federal government—in the region. What is now held by nonmembers can be legitimately taken by a seceding state.30

Federalism implies, therefore, that each ethnic group has its own home region and, consequently, that ethnic outsiders have a weaker claim to land than indigenous inhabitants. In effect, federalism implies that individuals are first and foremost citizens of ethnic regions, rather than of Ethiopia. There is a direct contradiction between the universalistic principles of the land policy, which accords all Ethiopian farmers equal land rights, and the territorial implications of ethnic federalism that suggest lesser rights for non-indigenous ethnic minorities.

Under federalism, land administration has been devolved to regional governments, which are required to formulate land proclamations within the framework of the federal land policy.31 Despite the implications of ethnic federalism for land administration, however, regional land proclamations—in line with federal land policy—do not mention ethnicity. For example, the Oromiya land proclamation states that ‘any resident of the region’ has the right to land.32 Furthermore, when asked about the potential for ethnicity to influence land administration, the head of the federal Land Use Administration denied that there could be any ethnic differentiation in land rights: ‘ethnicity should not influence policy, farmers are farmers’.33 The only instance in which land administration explicitly distinguished between ethnic groups was the government’s resettlement programme that relocated food insecure farmers from densely populated highlands to more sparsely populated lowlands, primarily in the west and south. In an attempt to limit ethnic conflict between resettled households and existing inhabitants of resettlement sites, resettlement was conducted within, rather than between, regions.34

Although the full territorial implications of ethnic federalism are not articulated in land laws, the ideas underpinning ethnic federalism continue to be widely debated in Ethiopia. On numerous occasions during fieldwork people—mostly outside state structures, but occasionally within them—argued for a more extreme interpretation of federalism: that it is necessary to differentiate between ethnic groups depending on whether they are in their ‘home’ region or not, even justifying the removal of ethnic minorities to their ‘home’ regions to preserve resources for the dominant ethnic group—effectively ethnic cleansing.35 As such, there remains the possibility that these more extreme ideas on ethnic federalism could influence implementation, beyond the explicit provisions of land laws.

The third and final set of land tenure institutions and related ideas concerns the neo-customary tenure system in Arssi, Oromiya. From a legal perspective, the 1975 nationalization eradicated any other form of tenure. However, in practice neo-customary tenure systems remain important influences on land administration in many parts of the country. I use the term neo-customary rather than customary in acknowledgement that ‘customary’ tenure systems are the product of inherited traditions adapted by state and societal actors. As Boone argues, it is invariably the case that ‘[p]ostcolonial governments have been deeply and actively implicated in upholding and reproducing the institutions and political relationships embedded in the (neo)customary land tenure regimes. It is incorrect to see customary land regimes as informal in the sense of existing beyond the purview of the state’.36 This rationale applies equally to neo-customary tenure in Ethiopia.

Neo-customary tenure remains a major influence on land administration in areas where pastoralism and shifting cultivation are the dominant forms of production and where the territorial reach of the state continues to be much more limited than in the highlands, namely in Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, the south of Oromiya, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), and Somali.37 However, even in areas of smallholder cultivation in Oromiya, including the part of Arssi covered by the case discussed below, and SNNPR, neo-customary tenure continues to be an influential alternative to state land administration.38

According to the ideals of Arssi Oromo neo-customary tenure, land is the property of the patrilineal descent group or clan, and a principal objective of neo-customary tenure is to retain land within the descent group.39 As such, women—who are required to marry out of the clan—lose rights to land in their birth clan upon marriage, while women who marry into a clan only have rights to land through their husband.40

As such, Arssi Oromo neo-customary tenure is in direct tension with the universalist principles of state land ownership. Rather than land being a right of national citizenship, according to neo-customary ideals land access is limited to clan members, in effect implying a form of local citizenship. To a degree, therefore, neo-customary tenure resonates with the territorial implications of ethnic federalism. Like federalism, neo-customary law associates an ethnic group with a particular territory and, in doing so, curtails land rights for ethnic outsiders, prioritizing local citizenship. However, the locus of authority and the territorial jurisdiction differ. Under the ideals of federalism, the regional government has ultimate authority, whereas clan elders are responsible under neo-customary tenure. Furthermore, local citizenship under neo-customary tenure is based on the clan, excluding not just non-Oromo, but also other Oromo clans, in contrast to federalism, which provides equal rights for all those from the dominant ethnic group of the region. Table 1 summarizes the differences between these ideal-type land tenure regimes. While the distinctions between these ideals are clear in principle, the reality of actual land tenure institutions is rather more ambiguous.

Table 1

Contrasting ideals on land in Ethiopia
State ownership Ethnic federalism Arssi Oromo neo-customary
Locus of authority over land Federal government Regional government Neo-customary leaders
Territorial jurisdiction National Regional Local
Citizenship principle National Ethnicity Clan membership
State ownership Ethnic federalism Arssi Oromo neo-customary
Locus of authority over land Federal government Regional government Neo-customary leaders
Territorial jurisdiction National Regional Local
Citizenship principle National Ethnicity Clan membership

Source: author, based on categories developed in Boone, Property and political order in Africa.

Table 1

Contrasting ideals on land in Ethiopia
State ownership Ethnic federalism Arssi Oromo neo-customary
Locus of authority over land Federal government Regional government Neo-customary leaders
Territorial jurisdiction National Regional Local
Citizenship principle National Ethnicity Clan membership
State ownership Ethnic federalism Arssi Oromo neo-customary
Locus of authority over land Federal government Regional government Neo-customary leaders
Territorial jurisdiction National Regional Local
Citizenship principle National Ethnicity Clan membership

Source: author, based on categories developed in Boone, Property and political order in Africa.

The picture is further complicated by Oromiya regional government attempts to re-establish the Gadaa institution. Gadaa is the customary system of social and political organization in Oromo society. During Imperial and Derg rule Gadaa was effectively wiped out in most of Oromiya and only really persisted among the Boran Oromo pastoralists. Since the early 2000s, the Oromiya People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO)—the regional EPDRF party—has sought to re-establish Gadaa as a means of compensating for its limited legitimacy. The OPDO has been regarded by many as an artificial creation of the TPLF/EPRDF that has struggled to establish legitimate authority in Oromiya. Indeed, the regional government recognizes that when it ‘works through the Gadaa it is more successful than through the local government’.41 As such, the position of Aba Gadaa—the political leader of the Gadaa and the ultimate authority over customary law—has been institutionalized in line with the government structures of zone and wereda42 and reports to the regional Bureau of Culture and Tourism.43 The regional land policy now also requires community elders to make the first attempt at dispute resolution, including with respect to land disputes. These elders are given training on government policy and issued with identity cards.44 Only if one party to a dispute is dissatisfied with the outcome does a case proceed to the courts or higher levels of government administration for adjudication.

In the process, the regional government has sought to transform neo-customary tenure, jointly announcing changes to customary law with the Aba Gadaa and codifying neo-customary law in a book held in the wereda offices.45 Amongst other things, these changes seek to enhance women’s rights to hold land and, most importantly for this article, allow ethnic minorities to hold land and even to nominate elders from ethnic minorities.

As such, there is now a distinct separation between popular ideas about the neo-customary tenure system as described above—frequently idealized as unchanging since the sixteenth century46—and what currently passes as customary tenure in parts of the region, which the regional government has sought to co-opt as a means of pursuing its policy objectives and enhancing its authority.
Conflict and land rights in practice

The case study presented in this section is used to illustrate the relevance of these ideas and institutions for land administration and to highlight the ambiguous state responses to one particular land conflict. The analysis builds on insights from Joel Migdal’s State-in-society approach and Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard’s Negotiating statehood framework.47 Rather than a unitary actor, the state is conceptualized as a network of distinct organizations, each with their own interests, in competition for domination with societal organizations. State officials, meanwhile, are embedded in society through their membership of families, clans, businesses or clubs. As such, policy implementation is not simply the impartial application of formal rules and laws by bureaucrats, but rather a negotiated process that may vary from the intentions of higher levels of government. In such circumstances, formal and informal institutions, and ideas all have the potential to influence decision-making.

Turufe Kechema occupies a fertile agricultural area suited to cereal production in the Rift Valley with good road links to nearby Shashemene town and Addis Ababa. Agricultural production is dominated by smallholder farmers, most of whom hold approximately 0.5–3 hectares of land.48 Turufe is part of the territory claimed by the Weyrera clan from the Arssi Oromo ethnic group. The Weyrera continued to apply neo-customary tenure on land that was not expropriated by the Imperial regime and in secret alongside state ownership during the Derg’s rule.49 Despite neo-customary tenure, however, successive governments have ignored clan and ethnicity in land administration and there has been a steady flow of migrants into Turufe.

In addition to the Weyrera, there are members of several other Arssi clans in Turufe who, under ideal-type neo-customary law would have no rights to land. Meanwhile, some of the first non-Oromo arrived during the Imperial conquest in the late nineteenth century. Northern soldiers (neftegna), especially Amhara and some Eritreans, were allocated rights to extract tribute from Arssi Oromo tenants (gebbar) as reward for military service.50 From the 1950s, migrants came for treatment at the nearby clinic, now the Shashemene Referral Hospital, a centre for leprosy treatment. At that time, Swedish Protestant missionaries, who established the clinic, held 12 gasha (480 hectares) around Turufe. These missionaries rehabilitated people treated for leprosy, in particular Kembata, by dividing two gasha between them.51 The area also attracted migrant labour during busy agricultural periods and some migrants have subsequently settled.

Under the Derg, land was redistributed several times between 1977 and 1990 to adjust for changing household size, taking no account of ethnicity, with the result that all kebele residents received land. Due to immigration and population growth, land shortages became a growing problem during the Derg era and an important driver of tensions over land. Since the EPRDF took power in 1991, land has not been redistributed with the result that landlessness has become a major issue, especially for young adults. At present there are significant minorities of Amhara, Tigrayan, Kembata, and Wolayita in Turufe, with the Oromo making up 54 per cent of the population according to one survey.52

o (Brill, Leiden, 2014).

47.

Joel Migdal, State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001); Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard (eds), Negotiating statehood: Dynamics of power and domination in Africa (Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2011).

48.

Since the mid-2000s, the government has promoted capital-intensive agricultural investments, particularly to the north of Turufe, but also in the area around Turufe itself. While these investments and urban expansion constitute important additional pressures on land in the area, these have only had a more recent impact and were not influential in the events discussed below.

49.

Getachew Fule and Mesfin Tadesse, Ethiopian village studies: Turufe Kechema (Addis Ababa University & University of Oxford, Addis Ababa & Oxford, 1996).

50.

Temesgen Gebeyehu, ‘A history of land measurement in Shashemene (Ethiopia), 1941–1974’, African Journal of History and Culture 1, 4 (2009): pp. 67–75.

51.

Interview, respondent TM26, male Kembata displaced from Turufe, Shashemene, 29 January 2010.

52.

CSAE, Ethiopian rural household survey 2004 (Centre for the Study of African Economies [CSAE], Oxford University, Oxford, 2004).

53.

Interview, respondent TM1, male Oromo resident, Turufe Kechema, 31 January 2010. The OLF was briefly a member of the post-Derg transitional government, but left before the 1992 elections and was banned as a terrorist organization.

54.

Interview, respondent TM17, male Kembata displaced from Turufe, Shashemene, 29 January 2010.

55.

Record 3a, Letter from the Oromiya Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development to the Oromiya Rural Land Administration Authority, date illegible.

56.

Fule and Tadesse, Ethiopian village studies.

57.

Interview, respondents TM3, male Oromo resident, Turufe Kechema, 28 January 2010; TM12, male Wolayita resident, Turufe Kechema, 14 January 2010; TM18, male Kembata resident, Turufe Kechema, 16 January 2010.

58.

Interview, respondents TM23, male Tigrayan resident, Turufe Kechema, 17 January 2010; TM26.

59.

Interview, respondents TM21; TM21, male Tigrayan resident, Turufe Kechema, 17 January 2010.

60.

Interview, respondents TM12; TK5, male member of kebele Land Administration Committee, Turufe Kechema, 14 January 2010.

61.

Interview, respondent TK5.

62.

Interview, respondent TM26.

63.

Interview, respondents TK5; TM4, male Oromo resident, Turufe Kechema, 28 January 2010.

64.

Interview, respondent TM18.

65.

Interview, respondents TM12, TM18.

66.

Interview, respondent TM18, a Kembata who remained in Turufe.

67.

Interview, respondent TM17, a Kembata displaced to Shashemene.

68.

Interview, respondent TM4, an Oromo.

69.

Interview, respondent TK5, an Oromo.

70.

Interview, respondent TM26, a Kembata displaced to Shashemene.

71.

Interview, respondent TM1, an Oromo.

72.

Interview, respondent TM23, a Tigrayan.

73.

Interview, respondents TM17; TM23.

74.

Yohannes Gezahegn, Bizuayehu Ayele, Getachew Fule, and Mesfin Tadesse, Ethiopian village studies II: Turufe Kechema (WeD-Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2006).

75.

Interview, respondent TM20, male Tigrayan resident, Turufe Kechema, 17 January 2010.

76.

Interview, respondent TM1, an Oromo.

77.

Interview, respondent TM17.

78.

Interview, respondents TM17; TM18; TM24, male Kembata resident, Turufe Kechema, 19 January 2010.

79.

Record 1e, Letter from the evicted farmers to Walta Information Centre, 14 October 2002; Record 1 f, Letter from the evicted farmers to the House of Peoples’ Representatives, 10 October 2002.

80.

Interview, respondent OR1, senior expert, Oromiya Land Use and Environmental Protection Bureau, Addis Ababa, 17 November 2009; ONRG, ‘Proclamation to amend the proclamation nos. 56/2002, 70/2003, 103/2005’.

82.

Record 2a, Letter from the federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to the association of evicted farmers, 5 November 2005; Record 4c, Letter from the federal Ombudsman to the Oromiya and SNNP regional governments, 23 August 2007.

84.

Record 7a, Letter from the East Shewa zone administration to the Shashemene wereda administration, 9 March 2000.

85.

Record 6a, Letter from Shashemene wereda administration to the East Shewa zone administration, 29 January 2002.

86.

Selassie, ‘Ethnic federalism’, p. 92.

88.

Vaughan, ‘Ethnicity and power in Ethiopia’.

89.

Abbink, ‘Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia’.

90.

Tesfaye Tafesse, The migration, environment and conflict nexus in Ethiopia: A case study of Amhara migrant-settlers in East Wollega Zone (OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2007).

92.

Tadesse Berisso, ‘Planning resettlement in Ethiopia: The experience of the Guji Oromo and the Nech Sar National Park’, in Alula Pankhurst and François Piguet (eds), Moving people in Ethiopia: Development, displacement and the state (James Currey, London, 2009), pp. 93–101.

93.

Lavers, ‘Agricultural investment in Ethiopia’.

94.

Vaughan, ‘Ethnicity and power in Ethiopia’.

95.

Jon Abbink, ‘Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia: Some problems and prospects of ethno-regional federalism’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24, 3 (2006), pp. 389–413, p. 390. This is in line with Boone’s hypothesis that the scale of land conflicts is shaped by institutional settings, with land conflicts ‘bottled up’ at local levels under more localized land tenure regimes. See Boone, Property and political order in Africa.

97.

EHRCO, ‘140th Special report: Executive summary’ (Ethiopian Human Rights Council, Addis Ababa, 2016), p. 5; René Lefort, ‘The ‘Ethiopian Spring’: ‘Killing is not an answer to our grievances’’, openDemocracy, 9 September 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-lefort/ethiopian-spring-killing-is-not-answer-to-our-grievances (12 September 2016). Given that the area around Turufe Kechema was among the main flashpoints of the protests in 2016 leading to a temporary breakdown in state control, this raises serious concerns about the situation in Turufe and the fate of the ethnic minorities there. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to conduct additional fieldwork.

98.

Boone, ‘Property and constitutional order’; Boone, Property and political order in Africa; Kyed and Buur, ‘New sites of citizenship’.

© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society

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የጎላን ኮረብታ ለእስራኤል መስጠት ያለው ፖለቲካዊ ኣንድምታ :-

የ#USA president Donald Trump የጎላን ኮረብቶችን #Gholan Heights የእስራኤል ግዛት ኣድርገው ዕውቅናን ሠጥተዋል። እነኝህን ኮረብታማ ስፍራዎች እስራኤል ከሶርያ የነጠቀችው እ.ኤ.አ.በ1967 ዓ.ም. በተደረገው ጦርነት የነጠቀቻቸው ሲሆኑ በዚህ ጦርነት የተቆጣጠረችውን የግብጽን ሲናይ በረሀ ግዛቶችን ከግብጹ መሪ አንዋር ሳዳት ጋር በተደረገ ሥምምነት ሥትመልሥ የሶርያን ጎልያን ኮረብቶችን ግን ለሶርያ ሳትመልሥ ለዘመናት ተቆጣጥራው ቆይታለች ።

የሶርያ መንግስት በተዳከመበትና ሶርያውያን ስደተኛ በሆኑበት በዚህ ወቅት ይህን ግዛት ከራስዋ ጋር መቀላቀል ተገቢ ጊዜ ነው ብለው አሜሪካኖችም ሆን እስራኤላውያን አስበው ሊሆን ይችላል።

የእስራኤሉ ጠ/ሚር ኔታንያኹ በዚህም ለአይሁዳውያን የጠቀመ ውሳኔን በማሳለፍ ለአይሁዳውያን መልካም ምግባርን ከማሳየት ተርታ ከሚሠለፉ ጥቂት ታላላቅ የታሪክ ሠዎች ተርታ ፕሬዝደንት ትራምፕን አሠልፈዋቸዋል። ኔታንያሁም ትራምፕን ከባልፎርድና ቂሮስ ተርታ ኣሰልፈዋቸዋል የUSA president ትራምፕን ።

ከባልፎርድ አዋጅ #Balford declaration እንዲሁም በመጽሐፍ ቅዱስ ጭምር በትንቢተ ኢሳያስ ስሙ የተጠቀሰውን ታላቁን የፐርሽያን ንጉሥ ከታላቁ ቂሮስ ተርታ አሰልፈዋቸዋል ኔታንያሁ ትራምፕን።

አሜሪካ በተለይም በባራክ ኦባማ ዘመን የበዛ ዘመናዊ የጦር መሳሪያን ለእስራኤል ኣስታጥቃታለች – ለእስራኤል ይኽን ኹሉ የጦር መሣርያ ኣልጠቀማትም ኣይባልም። ይልቁንም ግን እስራኤልን ከዚህ ሁሉ የተራቀቀ ዘመናዊ የጦር መሣሪያ ባሻገር ተጋላጭ ያደረጋት በቆዳ ስፋቷ እዚህ ግባ የማትባል ትንሽዪ ሀገር በመሆኗ ቅጽበታዊ ጥቃት ቢፈፀምባት ወደ ኋላ የምታፈገፍግበት መሬት ስለሌላት የኑክሌር ተቋማቶቿ ሳይቀር በጠላት እጅ የመውደቅ ዕድላቸው የሰፋ በመሆኑ ነው። እስራኤል በዙሪያዋ ካሉ የአረብ ሀገራት ራስዋን ለመከላከል ሰፊ መሬት ያሥፈልጋታል። ይህም በዙርያዋ ከሚገኙ አረቦችና ፍልስጥኤሞች ጋር በየግዜው የሚያፋጥጣት ሀይማኖት ሣይሆን የመሬት ጉዳይ ነው።

ራሽያ እና እስራኤል ከታክቲካል የኑክሌር መሣሪያ እስከ ስትራቴጂክ ቴርሞኑክሌር የጦር መሣሪያ፣ ከኢንተርኮንቲነንታል ቦልስቲክ ሚሳኤል እስከ “መልቲፕል ኢንዲፔንደንትሊ ታርጌትድ ሪ-ኢንትሪ ቬህክል” ሚሳኤል የታጠቁ ሀገራት ናቸው። ከሁለቱ ሀገራት ግን እስራኤል ደህንነትዋ ለአደጋ የተጋለጠና ሁሌም ደህንነትዋ የዛፍ ላይ እንቅልፍ የሆነባት ሀገር ነች – ለዚህ ምክንያቱ የእስራኤል የቆዳ ስፋት ነው ።

እንጂ ከራሽያ ይልቅ በጠላቶቿ ስለተከበበች አይደለም። እንደዛ ቢሆን ራሽያ እንዲያውም በኔቶ አባል ሀገራት በባህርም በየብስም ከመከበቧም በላይ በራሽያ እና በአሜሪካ መሀል ያለው የድንበር ርቀት የአራት ኪሎ ሜትር ርቀት ብቻ ነው (በአላስካ በኩል ማለት ነው )።

በተቃራኒው በቆዳ ስፋት ግዙፉ ሀገር ራሽያ አይደለም ወረራ ቢፈፀምበት፥ በኑክሌር ቢመታ እንኳን ሰፊ ይዞታ ያለው በመሆኑ ከአማራጭ ቦታዎች ላይ ሁኖ መልስ አፀፋ መስጠት ይችላል። መሠረታዊ ልዩነታቸውም ራሽያ እንደ ሀገር ስትራቴጂካዊ ጥልቀት ሲኖረው እስራኤል ግን እጅግ የተጋለጠች ትንሽ ሀገር ናት። ከዚሁ ጋር ተያይዞ ራሽያ ስትራቴጂካዊ ጥልቀት ስላለው ነበር በሁለተኛው የአለም ጦርነት ወቅት የናዚ ጦር እስከ ስታሊንግራድ ከደረሰ በኋላ ክረምቱን ተከትሎ የራሽያ ጦር የመልሶ ማጥቃት ሲያደርግ የናዚ ጦር የሎጅስቲክ አቅርቦት ውጊያው በሚፈልገው መጠን ለጦሩ ማድረስ ያልቻለው። በበረዶው ምክንያት የሩስያ ሰራዊት ስልታዊ ማፈግፈግን በማድረግ ጥሎ ቢሸሽም ፤ ሰተት ብሎ የገባው የናዚ ጦር ግን በረዶ እሚወርድበት ወቅት ,#Winter Season ስለደረሰበት እዛው በበረዶው ሊረግፍ ችሎአል ።